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Competing Claims: The Struggle for
Title in Nicaragua
ABSTRACT

Nicaragua's Sandinista Revolution of the 1980s left the
country's property scheme in a state of disarray. For eleven
years, the leftist Sandinista government instituted mass land
confiscations and agrarian reform that caused many
individuals to lose their property and flee the country. The
transition to democracy begun in 1990 has been a difficult
process for the country's new presidents who have been forced to
reconcile competing claims and fight corruption from within
their own ranks. In this Note, the Author examines the property
legacy created by the Sandinista Revolution. With another
round of presidential elections scheduled for November 2006,
the Author also examines whether Nicaragua will be able to
escape the wave of leftist leaders who have emerged successful in
recent elections throughout Latin America.
With the
international community once again focusing its attention on
Nicaragua, the Author suggests that the country must finally
resolve the status of its land titles in order to attract foreign
investment and increase its prospects for lasting democracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In many ways, Nicaragua's entire turbulent history over the last
century can be characterized as one large property dispute. As a
nation of 5.6 million people in Central America,1 Nicaragua's
household poverty index of 63%2 places it among the poorest nations
in the Western Hemisphere. 3 As in many parts of the developing
world, the concentration of Nicaragua's wealth in the hands of a
small minority had, up until the Sandinista Revolution of 1979,
historically deprived the majority of the nation's citizens of the ability
4
to own land.
The Sandinista Revolution brought Nicaragua much more than
just land reform, however, as it sparked a decade-long civil war that
resulted in the deaths of thousands of Nicaraguans and a national
economy crippled by massive debt and utter ruin. 5 Depending on
one's point of view, the situation in Nicaragua at the end of the
Sandinista Revolution in 1990 was either much better, or much
worse, than it was in 1979 when the violence first began. 6 Political
biases aside, however, there was no arguing with the fact that the
country's economy was in shambles both before and after the
Revolution.

1.
U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean, StatisticalYearbook for
Latin America and the Caribbean2003, 129, U.N. Doc LC/G.2224-P (May 2004).
2.
Id. at 53.
3.
See generally Jules Lobel, The Meaning of Democracy: Representative and
ParticipatoryDemocracy in the New NicaraguanConstitution, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 823,
844 (1988) (discussing poverty in Nicaragua).
4.
See J. David Stanfield & Steven E. Hendrix, Ownership Insecurity in
Nicaragua,22 CAP. U. L. REV. 939, 941 (1993).
5.
Hunter R. Clark & Amanda Velazquez, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin
America: Nicaragua-A Case Study, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 743, 792 (2000-2001).
6.
Compare Roberto Gargarella, Distributing Ownership of the Land: The
Alternatives Facing the New Democratic Government of Nicaragua,22 CAP. U. L. REV.
873, 885-86 (2003) (arguing that because of Somoza's prolonged looting of the
Nicaraguan treasury, Nicaragua's social development indicators actually improved
under the Sandinista regime despite the nation's civil war), with Clark & Velazquez,
supra note 5, at 793 (detailing how, in 1989, "Nicaragua was poorer than it had been a
decade earlier").
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Exhausted from eleven years of violence, yet left with little in the
way of lasting reform, Nicaragua found itself faced with two
dilemmas at the end of the Sandinista Revolution in 1990. Not only
was the nation faced with accomplishing the Revolution's initial goal
of providing for the poor, but it was also charged with correcting the
illegal actions taken by the Sandinista leadership that ran afoul of
the rights guaranteed by Nicaragua's Constitution, and even the
Sandinistas themselves, at least on paper. 7 While Nicaragua has
been forced to address many of the legacies of its civil war and the
Sandinista-led Revolution over the last fifteen years, the Sandinistas'
property schemes have been the most difficult to confront.8 Indeed,
as former Secretary of State James Baker once remarked, "the
investment community is going to take one more look at
Nicaragua ....If [it doesn't] have policies in place by then or at least
don't show that [it is] creating an environment for investment, they're
going to go somewhere else."9 As Nicaragua continues its attempts to
structure its property law in a way that reconciles the country's
colonial and revolutionary pasts with its democratic future, attracting
foreign investment can be a tall order.
With this in mind, this Note will begin by examining the
historical origins of the Somoza dynasty and the Sandinista
Revolution. Part III of this Note will then examine the radical
changes Nicaraguan property law experienced during the Sandinista
Revolution. Part III will also analyze the efforts made by Nicaragua's
three post-1990 democratic governments to reconcile the Sandinistas'
expropriations and other land confiscation policies with the claims of
dispossessed original landowners. Part IV will then briefly discuss
the upcoming November 2006 presidential election, as well as the
development opportunities that may result if the nation is finally able
to attract much-needed foreign investment.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Somoza Years
While the nations of Latin America have often been ruled by
military dictators since their independence, few have suffered from
the long-lasting effects of a family dynasty like Nicaragua. 10 Indeed,

7.
See 0. Herodocia Lacayo, The Current State of NicaraguanProperty Law,
22 CAP. U. L. REV. 839, 842-43 (1993).
8.
Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 768-69.
9.
See id. at 769 (citing Steve Fainaru, Rightist on Way to Victory in
NicaraguanElections, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 1996, at Al, available at LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Major Newspapers File).
10.
Gargarella, supra note 6, at 885.
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no matter how one feels about the property confiscations and other
actions undertaken by the Sandinista government, the root of
Nicaragua's current property crisis is almost always attributed to the
Somozas. 11 After decades of corruption under the Somozas-during
which the Nicaraguan treasury, land, and other resources were all
exploited for the benefit of a select few-the severity of the Sandinista
12
policies can only be described as a reaction to the Somoza years.
"The government of the Somoza regime is a clear example of how a
criterion that puts forward 'the increase of wealth' can lose its
legitimacy... when it is completely disconnected from improvements
'13
in health care, education and the diet of the rest of the society.
The "Somoza dynasty," as it has come to be known, 14 formally
began with the support of the United States when General Anastasio
Somoza Garcia assumed control of the country in 1937.15 Although
Somoza Garcia ruled Nicaragua for nineteen years during a time
when fascist leaders were generally disfavored on the world stage, the
support Somoza Garcia received from the United States allowed him
to remain in power. 16 Having studied in the United States, Somoza
Garcia had early visions of continuing his dictatorial legacy when he
sent his two sons to the United States to study. 17 It was the oldest of
these sons, Luis Somoza Debayle, who assumed control of Nicaragua
following Somoza Garcia's assassination in 1956.18 Anastasio Somoza
Debayle, Somoza Garcia's second son, and perhaps the most infamous
member of the Somoza dynasty, served as commander of the
National Guard, and assumed the presidency in 1967.19
Despite the Somozas' totalitarian tactics, Nicaragua's economy
20
saw marked growth during the forty-plus years they were in power.
Fueled by international instability and a high demand on the world
market, Nicaragua's exports of cotton, sugar, meat, and seafood
increased exponentially during the 1950s. 21 Nicaragua's fortunes,
however, did not translate into gains for the nation's population at
large. 22 While foreign capital flowed into Nicaragua, it failed to reach
23
the impoverished majority of Nicaraguans.

11.
(describing
12.
Sandinista
13.
14.

See id.
See generally Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 784-89
the Somoza dictatorship).
See generally Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 792-94 (describing the
regime's actions after they came into power).
Gargarella, supra note 6, at 885.
Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 785.

15.

Id.

16.

Id. at 785-86.

17.

Id.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 786.
Id. at 786-87.
Gargarella, supra note 6, at 885.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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[I]n spite of a gross domestic product that rose during [the 1950s] by
250%, the rapid economic expansion was not transferred into an
equally rapid improvement of social indicators. At the end of the boom,
the indices for literacy, infant mortality and life expectancy were
24
among the worst in Latin America.

Indeed, the Somozas' greed only appeared to worsen as power passed
from one Somoza to the next, and "[1]ike their father, the sons
'25
constantly added to the family's wealth.
The Somozas ultimately carried their graft too far, however. In
December 1972, massive earthquakes hit Nicaragua's capital city of
26
Managua, resulting in the deaths of over ten thousand people.
Various nations, including the United States, responded to the
disaster with millions of dollars in aid money, which was quickly
pocketed by Anastasio Somoza Debayle. 27 U.S. President Jimmy
Carter was a strong proponent of human rights, and the United
States was thus unwilling to continue supporting Somoza Debayle
when he was swept from power by the Sandinistas on July 20, 1979.28
B. Revolution and SandinistaRule
Drawing their name from a 1930s-era foe and eventual victim of
General Somoza Garcia, 29 the Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) was the political reincarnation of a terrorist organization the
Somozas had long since disregarded. 30
Following nearly half a
century of self-enrichment by the Somozas, the main goal of the
FSLN was to improve the conditions of the impoverished majority of
Nicaragua's citizens. 3 1 While many have argued that the Sandinista
Revolution was fundamentally socialist in its philosophies, and that
"the Sandinistas abandoned all pretense of pluralism and
incrementally initiated a totalitarian, Marxist-Leninist state that was
modeled after Cuba and aligned with the Soviet Union, '32 this view
has not been universally accepted. Instead, others have argued, the
primary force behind the 1979 overthrow of Somoza was the leader's
unbridled greed, and that in actuality "[tlhe FSLN... sought to
ensure that the needs and interests of the working class and
peasantry [were] dominant in all aspects of Nicaraguan life, yet at
the same time [it sought] to maintain the political, economic and

24.
25.
EN POCAS
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 787 (citing ENRIQUE BOLANOS GEYER,
PALABRAS-: NICARAGUA: 165 A.&OS DE VIDA INDEPENDENTE 20 (1987)).
Id. at 788.
Id. at 788-89.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 784-85
Id. at 790-91.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 792.
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cultural space for capitalist relations.13 3 It is this dual purpose, it is
argued, that allowed the FSLN to draw support not only from the
poorest sectors of Nicaraguan society, but also from the middle-class
"anti-Somocista" elements as well.3 4 This view is certainly helpful in
explaining why the middle class, which would clearly disfavor pure
Marxism, was nonetheless extremely grateful to the FSLN for
35
sounding the death knell of the Somoza regime.
The difficulty one experiences in labeling the FSLN's precise
political underpinnings is perhaps the result of its inability to keep
up with its overnight transition from guerilla terrorist organization to
ruling political party. Indeed, while the FSLN undertook a rapid
nationalization of both Nicaragua's major industries and privatelyheld property, it was not always accomplished by strict adherence to
parliamentary procedure.3 6 Although the FSLN passed a dizzying
number of decrees and acts that placed 35% of the nation's private
property under its control,3 7 it neglected to amend the Nicaraguan
Constitution of 1974 that upheld the right to private property and
stated that all other laws were subordinate to this fundamental
right.3 8
This fact has led some to suggest that "the [FSLN]
confiscatory laws, decrees and resolutions . . . have absolutely no

value at all. Moreover, property rights have not been changed in
substance by legislation or any other acts of government. The nature
of property law [did] not change[] one iota during the [Sandinista
Revolution]."a9

Despite the technical legal justification behind such logic, the
clear reality is that the Sandinista years did change Nicaraguan
property law in a great number of ways. FSLN decrees and land
reform policies resulted in a protracted ten year civil war that raged
on through the final days of the Cold War. 40 Additionally, even
though the end of Nicaragua's Revolution coincided with the FSLN's
political loss in the February 1990 presidential elections, the
Sandinistas remain a political party in Nicaragua today. 4 1 As such,
the FSLN continues to play a role in supporting its property
confiscation policies of the past, even as subsequent administrations
42
work to undo the great legal uncertainties they have caused.

33.
34.

Lobel, supra note 3, at 841.
Id.

35.

See id.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Lacayo, supra note 7, at 841-42.
Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 768.
Lacayo, supra note 7, at 841-42.
Id. at 842.
Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 790-92.
Id. at 794-95.
Id. at 794-96.
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C. Transition to Democracy
Following the defeat of the FSLN in the February 1990 elections,
Nicaragua began on its long path to both democracy and
reconstruction. 43 The FSLN was driven from power by the fourteenparty United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) coalition headed by
Violeta Barrios Chamorro, the widow of an assassinated newspaper
publisher who had been a vocal critic of the Somoza regime.
"Chamorro inherited a virtually bankrupt economy."'44 Still, during
her six years in office, Chamorro spearheaded a monumental effort to
rectify the illegalities committed by the FSLN, heal the wounds
caused by the nation's protracted civil war, and bring much-needed
45
foreign investment back to Nicaragua.
While the reform policies of the post-Sandinista administrations
will be examined in greater detail below, it is agreed that no
administration has been able to conclusively deal with this ongoing
dilemma. 46 Indeed, "because the Chamorro administration failed to
resolve the issue of property ownership, it . . .remain[ed] one of the
biggest problems '47 faced by Nicaragua's second post-Sandinista
democratically-elected president, Arnoldo Aleman of the Liberal
Coalition. 48 Aleman's five-year term expired in 2002 and-under the
supervision of large-scale international elections monitoringNicaragua succeeded in choosing a third democratically-elected
49
president, Enrique Bolafios.
The 2001 election of Liberal candidate Bolafios was watched with
special interest around the world because Bolafios was opposed by the
FSLN leader, and former guerilla fighter, Daniel Ortega. 50 Although
the voting process was familiar to Nicaraguans in 2001, the election
was not without contest. 51 Following the pronouncement of Bolafios
as the winner of the election, Ortega and the FSLN raised challenges
in the Nicaraguan courts. The results were briefly overturned by an
appeals court before Bolafios' victory was ultimately declared by the
Nicaraguan Supreme Court. 52 While the eventual outcome of the

43.
See generally ALMA GUILLERMOPRIETO, THE HEART THAT BLEEDS: LATIN
AMERICA NOW 23-46 (Knopf 1994).

44.
Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 794; Violeta Chamorro, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VioletaChamorro (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
45.
Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 794-95.
46.
Id. at 768-69.
47.
See id. at 768.
48.
Id. at 795-96.
49.
See DAVID R. DYE & SHELLEY A. MCCONNELL, THE CARTER CENTER,
OBSERVING THE 2001 NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS: FINAL REPORT (2002), available at

http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1027.pdf.
50.

Id. at 10.

51.
52.

See id. at 27-28.
Id.
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2001 presidential election reassured proponents of Nicaraguan
democracy, the event also demonstrated the fragility of the country's
political system and the continued viability of the FSLN as a political
force in Nicaragua. 53
Indeed, international elections monitors
observed that "[a]lthough Nicaragua has successfully conducted a
series of democratic national elections, making alterations in the
election law and system before each vote .. . the changes have not led
to cumulative progress." 54 Furthermore, the Bolafios-Ortega struggle
following the 2001 election once again highlights the enormous
obstacles faced by Nicaragua's post-1990 democratic administrations
in settling key legal matters.
First and foremost among these unresolved issues, of course, is
Nicaragua's property crisis. As discussed in the next Part, it is clear
that the ability of the nation's leaders to address the property
dilemma is hopelessly lost among the political turmoil that continues
in Nicaragua. 55 It was following the FSLN's 1990 electoral defeat, in
fact, that the Sandinista leadership committed some of its most
egregious property violations, "award[ing] land to people who were
not eligible," through means that have been "viewed as illegitimate by
most political groups. ' 56 Although President Chamorro promptly
took steps to address these violations, she was understandably
constrained in the amount of power she could exercise as the first
democratically-elected president following more than a decade of
bloody conflict. 5 7 These factors, when combined with the FSLN's
continued political existence and support for its own confiscatory
policies, have created a very difficult atmosphere for conclusively
resolving the property issue. 58
Although some attention has been given in the relevant
literature-by means of discussion-to the property legislation
enacted by the FSLN, 59 little effort has been made in the United
States to actually translate and examine the key provisions of this
legislation in an effort to better understand the legacy it has created
in Nicaragua. Because of advancements in technology, namely the
creation of the electronic database maintained by the Nicaraguan
National Assembly,6 0 access to past and present legislation is now
easier than ever before. It should be noted that all translations from
the Nicaraguan Civil Code and other executive orders found below

53.
See id. at 24-29.
54.
Id. at 29.
55.
See generally Stanfield & Hendrix, supra note 4, at 948-49.
56.
Id. at 948.
57.
See id. at 949-50.
58.
See id. at 958-63.
59.
See Stanfield & Hendrix, supra note 4; Gargarella, supra note 6; Lacayo,
supra note 7.
60.
See Asamblea Nacional de Nicaragua, Portal Legistivo Nicaragua,
http://www.asamblea.gob.ni (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
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are those of the Author, but have been made in an effort to fully
demonstrate the substance of these important provisions. In addition
to the FSLN legislation, the next Part also examines the measures
taken by the three democratically-elected post-1990 administrations
to remedy the property crisis created by the Sandinistas.

III. ANALYSIS:

THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY

A. PropertyReform Under the Sandinistas
1. First Steps
Although the Sandinistas were able to gain control of Nicaragua
in July of 1979, the last leader of the Somoza dynasty refused to leave
without a fight. On September 11, 1978, President Anastasio Somoza
Debayle issued Executive Decree Number 3, in which he declared the
commencement of a thirty-day period of martial law in the zones of
Masaya and Esteli, both of which are located just south of
Managua. 61 Describing the decree as necessary to combat "acts of
terrorism, arson, assassination and other crimes punishable by law,"
including the destruction of public property, Anastasio Somoza
Debayle issued an official thirty-day suspension of "all constitutional
guarantees" in the Departments of Masaya and Estel. 62 The initial
limited declaration of martial law in these zones was expanded just
63
two days later, on September 13, 1978, to cover the entire country.
In this second decree of martial law, Anastasio Somoza Debayle
justified his actions by citing armed attacks, which he alleged had
occurred in virtually every major city and town in Nicaragua in the
days preceding the decree. 64
With a touch of irony, however,
Anastasio Somoza Debayle suspended Nicaraguans' constitutional
guarantees as the result of a "campaign of public agitation and
subversive propaganda" begun by groups he labeled as "oppos[ite] to
Nicaragua's constitutional regime. '65 To this end, the President
explained the supposed discovery of foreign elements that had
penetrated the country, consisting of both Nicaraguans living abroad
and foreign mercenaries who sought to introduce communism into

61.
Decretos Ejecutivos No. 3, 11 Sept. 1978, Decr~tase Ley Marcial en Masaya
y Esteli [Declaration of Martial Law in Masaya and Esteli], La Gaceta [L.G.], 11 Sept.
1978 (Nicar.).
62.
Id.
63.
Decreto Ejecutivos No. 56, 13 Sept. 1978, Decr~tase Ley Marcial en Toda la
Republica [Declaration of Martial Law in the Entire Republic], La Gaceta [L.G.], 18
Sept. 1978 (Nicar.).
64.
Id. 3.
65.
Id.
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Nicaragua's otherwise "democratic institutions." 66 Anastasio Somoza
Debayle supported his expanded decree of martial law not only with
his concern for Nicaragua and its constitutional democracy, but also
with his self-proclaimed duty to protect the Western Hemisphere
67
from "the recognized proponents of international communism."
Despite Anastasio Somoza Debayle's decrees of martial law and
other attempts to perpetuate his family's control of Nicaragua, the
international community failed to protect him from the Sandinista
takeover the following year. Just two days following the overthrow of
Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the Sandinista leadership, led principally
by Daniel Ortega and Violeta Barrios Chamorro, and referring to
itself as La Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucci6n de la Repfiblica de
Nicaragua, 68 passed a "National Emergency Law" on July 22, 1979.69
Blaming the "genocidal actions of Somoza" for the countless deaths
and destruction of personal property and industry in Nicaragua, the
Sandinista emergency decree covered the entire country for an initial
subject to extension for as long as the
period of thirty days, and was
70
state of emergency persisted.
Perhaps the most striking features of the Sandinistas' emergency
decree were the severity and immediacy of the restrictions placed on
private property. 71 Only two days after the fall of Anastasio Somoza
Debayle, the Sandinistas' views on private property were made clear
through the emergency law which stated that "the State [could] make
rational use of any residence or private building for purposes of public
72
utility after remitting to the owner a just compensation."
Additionally, Article 4 of the emergency law also placed all private
colleges and other educational institutions at the service of the
73
state.
Perhaps even more troubling than the restrictions on real
property were the Sandinistas' restrictions on personal property.
They were largely controlled by a five line provision in the emergency
law that suspended all transfers of movable and immovable goods
74
that resulted from agreements effectuated after December 31, 1977.
Additionally, the Sandinistas attempted to exercise control over even
the individual labor of the populace, declaring that "local authorities

Id.
4-5.
66.
67.
Id. 5.
This elaborate title for the early Sandinista leadership translates into
68.
English as "The Government Coalition of National Reconstruction for the Republic of
Nicaragua."
Decretos-Ley No. 10, 22 July 1979, Ley de Emergencia Nacional [National
69.
Emergency Law], La Gaceta [L.G.], 23 Aug. 1979 (Nicar.).
Id. at "Considerando" no.1, art. 13.
70.
Id. art. 4.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. art. 3.
74.
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[could] require the collaboration of the citizenry in the realization of
'75
unpaid labor undertaken for the benefit of the community.
Besides formulating their general property policies applicable to
the nation as a whole, the Sandinistas also singled out the former
adherents of the fallen Somoza regime for special treatment. 76 On
July 20, 1979, the very day of its takeover, the Sandinista coalition
passed Decree Number 3, entitled "Confiscation of Goods," which
ordered the Procurador General de Justicia to "immediately
confiscate all goods" of the Somoza family, as well as Somoza's key
military supporters who had fled the country anytime after December
1977. 77 This initial decree was later greatly expanded on August 8,
1979, to apply not only to Somoza and his key allies, but also to all
"persons alleged [to be followers of Somoza], for whom a
denouncement has been made, or who [the Procurador General]
considers it prudent" to take the preventive measure of either
restricting their alienability of property or confiscating such property
altogether. 78 Feeling that the anti-Somoza decrees had served their
purpose by the end of 1979, the Sandinista coalition attempted to
boost its image by suspending them on November 21, 1979, and
prohibiting the future seizure of property owned by Somoza
sympathizers. 79 The suspension of the seizure decrees, however, was
largely meaningless given the authority granted to the Procurador
General to continue administering seizures which, up until that
point, had already taken place under the previous decrees.8 0
2. Decree Number 760: "The Absence Law"
While the Sandinistas' initial appropriations focused on the
Somozas and their allies, the coalition's Decree Number 760officially titled "Appropriation by the State of Abandoned Goods" but
more commonly referred to as the "Absence Law" 8 1-was a much
more comprehensive statute targeting the exile community as a

75.
Id. art. 5.
76.
See Decretos-Ley No. 3, 20 July 1979, Confiscacion de Bienes
[Confiscation of Goods], La Gaceta [L.G.], 22 Aug. 1979 (Nicar.); Decretos-Ley No. 38,
8 Aug. 1979, Aclaraci6n y Adici6n al Decreto No. 3 [Explanation and Addition to
Decree No. 3], La Gaceta [L.G.], 3 Sept. 1979 (Nicar.).
77.
Decretos-Ley No. 3, 20 July 1979 art. 1.
78.
Decretos-Ley No. 38, 8 Aug. 1979 art. 1.
79.
Decretos-Ley No. 172, 21 Nov. 1979, Suspensi6n Aplicaci6n Decreto No. 38
de 8 de Agosto de 1979 [Suspension of the Application of Decree 38 of August 8, 1979],
La Gaceta [L.G.], 24 Nov. 1979 (Nicar.).
80.
Id. art. 3.
81.
Jos6 Armando Arag6n Manzanares, La Propiedad en Nicaragua, available
at http://www.monografias.com/trabajos5/nicaragua/nicaragua.shtml (last visited Mar.
30, 2006) (unpublished Civil Law final paper, Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de
Nicaragua).
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whole.8 2 Stating that reconstruction was a "priority task of the
Revolution... [and required] the rational use of property," and
aiming to target those property owners who had "irresponsibly
abandoned goods necessary to the reactivation of the national
economy," the Sandinistas' Abandoned Goods statute purported to
seize all property, both movable and immovable, of any Nicaraguan
83
who remained "absent" from the country for six months or longer.
The Abandoned Goods statute placed broad seizure power in the
Sandinistas' Ministry of Justice, which was required to publish
proposed seizures in a national registry and give owners fifteen days
to present themselves to the Ministry before their property would be
officially seized.8 4 Additionally, notions of due process were largely
absent from the Ministry of Justice's broad authority to adjudicate
property seizures on the basis of otherwise ambiguous criteria.8 5 For
instance, in the case of an absent property owner whose spouse or
children remained in Nicaragua, the Ministry of Justice had the
authority to permit the owner's family to retain the property, but only
8 6
if such use was deemed "rational."
The Sandinistas' Abandoned Goods statute was also especially
harsh in several other regards, including its treatment of lessees of
"abandoned property," and those who contracted to purchase or
87
otherwise take control of property from landowners who chose exile.
With respect to lessees who occupied property that was deemed to be
"abandoned" by the Ministry of Justice, Article 6 of the decree
required such individuals to present themselves to the Ministry of
Justice within thirty days following the promulgation of the statute.
If they did not appear, the property they occupied was subject to
automatic seizure.88
Additionally, for purposes of determining
whether or not property had been "abandoned" under the language of
the decree, Article 8 presumed ownership from the day preceding the
overthrow of Somoza, July 19, 1979.8 9 Therefore, Article 8 took the
extreme view of "declar[ing] null all negotiations, acts and contracts
which would have [otherwise] been brought to effect over such goods"
following the Sandinistas' rise to power, unless affected individuals
could appear before the Ministry of Justice and prove their "good
faith."90

82.
Decretos-Ley No. 760, 19 July 1981, Apropiaci6n por el Estado de los
Bienes Abandonados [Appropriation by the State of Abandoned Goods], La Gaceta
[L.G.], 22 July 1981 (Nicar.)
83.
Id.
84.
Id. art. 3.
85.
See id.
86.
See id.
87.
Id. arts. 6, 8.
88.
Id. art. 6.
89.
Id. art. 8.
90.
Id.
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Unlike other decrees passed by the Sandinistas during their first
days in power, the Abandoned Goods statute continued in effect for
over six years, until it was finally repealed on September 25, 1987.91
Indeed, the Abandoned Goods statute was only repealed by thenSandinista President Daniel Ortega after Nicaragua signed a Central
American Peace Accord in Guatemala in August 1987, through which
regional leaders agreed to "put into place actions promoting national
reconciliation and democratization. ' 92 Nonetheless, as with most of
the Sandinistas' repeals of property seizure decrees, Article 2 of the
repeal statute clearly stated that all actions previously ratified under
the Abandoned Goods statute remained unchanged by the subsequent
repeal.93 Thus, for the vast majority of exiles, who fled the country
during the violence of the late 1970s and early 1980s when the
statute was in effect, the Abandoned Goods statute resulted in the
seizure of substantial property from "absent landowners." As a
result, the Abandoned Goods statute is one of the key Sandinista
legacies that has contributed to Nicaragua's modern-day property
crisis and, in particular, to the dilemma facing the country's exiles
who have since returned to their homeland.
3. The Revolution Spreads: The Advent of True Agrarian Reform
Although the Abandoned Goods statute applied to all property
allegedly abandoned in Nicaragua by "absent landowners," the law
was initiated contemporaneously with the Sandinistas' own system of
agrarian reform. 94 Article 5 of the Abandoned Goods statute provided
that rural property should be administered by the Ministerio de
Desarrollo Agropecuario y Reforma Agraria (MIDINRA).95 As such,
Article 5 signaled the Sandinistas' eventual goal of effectuating
agrarian reform in Nicaragua, which was a key component of the
Revolution's ultimate plan for economic and social change. 96
Agrarian reform formally began on the same day that the Abandoned
Goods statute took effect, by means of the Sandinista coalition's first
97
Agrarian Reform Law.
Invoking the spirit of Augusto Sandino, the rebel guerilla leader
from whom they drew their name, the Sandinistas made it clear in
the Agrarian Reform Law that their policies were designed to combat

91.
Leyes No. 30, 25 Sept. 1987, Ley que Deroga el Decreto No. 760 [Repeal of
Decree 760], La Gaceta [L.G.], 2 Nov. 1987 (Nicar.).
92.
Id.
93.
Id. art. 2.
94.
See Decretos-Ley No. 760, 19 July 1981, art. 5.
95.
In English, the name of this governmental administrative agency roughly
translates as the Ministry of Agro-fisheries Development and Agrarian Reform.
96.
See Decretos-Ley No. 760, 19 July 1981, art. 5.
97.
Decretos-Ley No. 782, 19 July 1981, Ley de Reforma Agraria [Agrarian
Reform Law], La Gaceta [L.G.], 21 Aug. 1981 (Nicar.).
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both the Somoza years and the preceding latifundismo.98 Based on
an attempt to "revise the right of the peasant to live dignifiedly from
working the land and to guarantee his incorporation into the national
plans and agricultural development under appropriate forms of
organization... [that] foment production and... guarantee the most
adequate and rational use of the land," the Sandinistas' initial
Agrarian Reform Law contemplated an ambitious reorganization of
the nation's rural property. 99
Although the Agrarian Reform Law labeled the confiscations of
land formerly held by the Somoza family and their allies as a "first
step" in the critical agrarian reform process, the law as embodied in
Decree Number 782 also envisioned far more comprehensive
reform.' 00 The Agrarian Reform Law specifically targeted property
that the MIDINRA viewed as "idle" or "underutilized," meaning that
the Sandinista government did not feel that it had been cultivated to
its full potential in the two years preceding the passage of the
statute. 0 1 The statute discriminated against large landowners by
setting geographical limitations targeting landowners who owned
only a certain quantity of land for redistribution. 10 2 Additionally, the
law outlined and prioritized the specific groups able to receive title to
redistributed property under the statute, including, in the following
order: those who actually worked the land that was being
redistributed, those who were either landless or without sufficient
land to maintain an adequate existence, those individuals or
cooperatives capable of ensuring that the land would be adequately
worked, and finally, other larger enterprises specifically constituted
by the state to carry out the proposed agrarian reform.' 0 3 The law
also provided for compensation in the form of government bonds for
landowners who were dispossessed of their land by means other than
abandonment, as well as the transmission and recording of fee simple
title to those who received land under the statute. 10 4 Finally, the
Agrarian Reform Law placed additional restrictions upon the
alienability rights of even those landowners whose land was not

98.
See id. Latifundismo is a term often used to refer to the inequitable
distribution of land that occurred in many parts of Latin America as a result of
Spanish colonial administration and governance.
See Lola Clayton Rainey,

Monopolistic Land Tenure and Free Trade in Mexico: Resurrecting the Ghost of the
PorfirianEconomics, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 217, 261-62 (1998-1999).
99.
Decretos-Ley No. 782, 19 July 1981, consideration IV.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. art. 9.
104.
Id. arts. 10, 11. Note, also, that it is these two aspects of Sandinista
property reform (i.e., compensation in the form of government bonds, and the recording
of new titles) that have proven most troublesome in the years since Nicaragua's return
to democracy in 1990. This history will be more fully analyzed below.
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redistributed, prohibiting them from partitioning or transferring
their property in a 5way that would allow it to escape redistribution
10
under the statute.
As the initial Sandinista Revolution evolved into an increasingly
violent and devastating civil war, it became clear that the original
Agrarian Reform Law enacted in Decree Number 782 was unable to
fully address the massive problems Nicaragua faced with respect to
property reform. 10 6 One of the most daunting problems faced by the
Sandinista leadership was the method by which the newly distributed
Other more immediate
land would be titled and recorded.1 0 7
problems were created by the dissent of those who lost their property,
which added fuel to the nation's already burning civil war.10 8 In an
attempt to rectify these and other problems, the Sandinistas passed
an additional series of reforms during the final years of their political
leadership. 109
First amongst these latter reforms was the somewhat amusinglytitled "Reform to the Agrarian Reform Law," passed on January 13,
1986.110 Although Decree Number 14 begins with much of the same
revolutionary rhetoric seen in prior Sandinista decrees-denouncing
the now long-gone sins of the Somoza dynasty and the evils of the
latifundismo system"'-it also reflects the decreasing political power
of the Sandinista leadership in the late 1980s. This fact is perhaps
most evident in the Sandinistas' attempt to justify their reform not
only in light of their concern for the country's poor, but also out of
respect for the "recommendations" of the United Nations and other
international institutions.
The decree identifies these as
organizations "which recognize that 'latifundismo,' idleness of the
land, and the marginalization suffer[ed] by the peasantry, [are]
principal causes that restrain the economic and social development of
the people. 11 2 In terms of actual substance, Decree Number 14 was
also different in that it offered some concessions to the opposition, as
well as additional safeguards to those whose land was expropriated
113
under its provisions.
As opposed to the original Agrarian Reform Law, Decree Number
14 created an Agrarian Tribunal capable of overruling the previously
limitless authority of the MIDINRA with respect to the adjudication

105.
Id. arts. 31-33.
106.
Arag6n Manzanares, supranote 81, at § 5.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
Leyes No. 14, 11 Jan. 1986, Reforma a la Ley de Reforma Agraria [Reform
to the Agrarian Reform Law], La Gaceta [L.G.], 13 Jan. 1986 (Nicar.).
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Compare id. with Decretos-Ley No. 782, 19 July 1981, Ley de Reforma
Agraria [Agrarian Reform Law], La Gaceta [L.G.], 21 Aug. 1981 (Nicar.).
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of conflicts arising between landowners dispossessed of property and
the Sandinista government. 114 Thus, the right of appeal created by
Decree Number 14 was a significant due process victory for those
seeking to challenge expropriations carried out in the course of
agrarian reform. Additionally, the new Agrarian Reform Law revised
the system of government indemnification bonds granted to
115
landowners whose property was expropriated under the decree.
Under Decree Number 14, the amount of the indemnification bonds
granted was calculated in accordance with the MIDINRA's estimation
of the value of the property. The decree also enabled certain property
owners who lacked other ready sources of income to receive a monthly
pension. 116 Somewhat notably, however, the Sandinista leadership
refused to alter its long-standing policy of disfavoring land it deemed
to have been abandoned, and thus the indemnification provision of
Decree Number 14 still did not apply to "cases of abandonment or
117
idleness," as defined by the statute.
4.

The Sandinistas and the 1987 Constitution: An Attempt at
Constitutional Legitimacy

The Sandinistas have often been criticized for initiating property
reform without first repealing or amending the 1974 Nicaraguan
Constitution. 118
Perhaps cognizant of this fact by 1987, the
Sandinistas attempted to legitimize their property redistribution
schemes through the passage of a new constitution. 119
While the Sandinistas failed to either repeal or replace the 1974
Constitution initially, they did pass a loftily worded statute entitled
"Statute on Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans" only one month
after deposing Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979.120 In this statute,
which is in many respects akin to a mini-constitution, the Sandinistas
made a number of statements that were contradicted by their
increasingly undemocratic tactics. For example, the Rights and
Guarantees statute stated that "the Nicaraguan people have the right
to dispose freely of their riches and natural resources,"1 ' and that "a

114.
Leyes No. 14, 11 Jan. 1986 art. 17.
115.
Id.art. 20.
116.
Id. arts. 21-22.
117.
Id. art. 20.
118.
Lacayo, supra note 7, at 842.
119.
Constituci6n Politica de la Repdiblica de Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution], La
Gaceta [L.G.] 9 Jan. 1987, as amended by Ley No. 330, Reforma Parcial a la
Constituci6n Politica de la Rep~iblica de Nicaragua, Jan. 18, 2000, L.G. Jan. 19, 2000
(Nicar.).
120.
Leyes No. 52, 21 Aug. 1979, Estatuto Sobre Derechos y Garantias de los
Nicaragiuenses [Statute on Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans], La Gaceta [L.G.],
17 Sept. 1979 (Nicar.).
121.
Id. art. 2.
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person's home and all other private spaces are inviolable." 122 At the
same time, the statute blurred such private property rights with the
Sandinistas' redistribution policies, stating also that "every
Nicaraguan has the right to freely choose his residence'' 123 and that
"work is the
right and social
responsibility
of every
individual .. . [and it is] the obligation of the state to procure work
and productivity for all Nicaraguans in conditions that guarantee
fundamental human rights." 124 The statute also specifically referred
to property as "fulfill[ing] a social function," thereby subjecting it to
certain limitations required by productivity, security, public interest,
Finally, while the Rights and
and national emergencies. 125
Guarantees statute at first seemed to afford Nicaraguans democratic
rights, it ultimately included an "escape clause" which allowed the
Sandinistas to later justify their harsh policies. 12 6 In this regard,
Article 49 of the statute allowed the coalition to suspend all or part of
the statute in the event of "exceptional situations ... which put in
danger the life and stability of the nation," including but not limited
to, civil war or "public order and security. '127 Indeed, as noted above,
the concept of property rights under the Sandinista leadership leaned
much more heavily towards expropriation under the Absence and
Agrarian Reform Laws than it did in favor of protecting pre-existing
private property.
In a subsequent attempt to further justify their land
redistribution schemes, the Sandinistas replaced the Rights and
Guarantees statute with a new Constitution on January 9, 1987.128
In addition to passing the Constitution, the Sandinistas also declared
a state of national emergency and suspended the rights and
guarantees embodied in the previous 1974 Constitution. 129 Unlike
the Sandinistas' previous attempts to lend their policies an air of
democratic legitimacy in the Rights and Guarantees statute, the 1987
Constitution was very much a revolutionary document. Invoking the
"example of Carlos Fonseca, the highest continuator of the
inheritance of Sandino, and founder of the National Sandinista
Liberation Front [FSLN]," the 1987 Constitution described itself as

122.

Id. art. 18.

123.

Id. art. 15.

124.

Id. art. 29.

125.
Id. art. 27.
126.
Id. art. 49.
127.
Id.
128.
Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Nicaragua [Cn.][Constitution], La
Gaceta [L.G.] 9 Jan. 1987, as amended by Ley No. 330, Reforma Parcial a la
Constituci6n Politica de la Rep6blica de Nicaragua, Jan. 18, 2000, L.G. Jan. 19, 2000
(Nicar.).
129.
Decretos Ejecutivos No. 245, 9 Jan. 1987, Suspensi6n de Derechos y
Garantias [Suspension of Rights and Guarantees], La Gaceta [L.G.], 23 Jan. 1987
(Nicar.).
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created for the "institutionalization of the conquests of the Revolution
and the construction of a new society that eliminates all classes of
exploitation and achieves economic, political, and social equality for
30
Nicaraguans."1
With respect to the Sandinistas' property policies, the 1987
Constitution specifically recognizes the legitimacy of agrarian
reform. 131 Indeed, Chapter II of the Constitution embodies much of
the language of the prior Agrarian Reform Laws, and proclaims that
"[t]he State guarantees the success of agrarian reform, to give
fulfillment to the historical revindications of the peasantry,"'132 and
"agrarian reform will abolish 'latifundismo'.' 1 33 As discussed below,
the Sandinistas would later rely on their 1987 Constitution to justify
their last-ditch efforts to preserve their property reforms, including
the "pifiata" titling laws which have created one of the most troubling
134
legacies of the Sandinistas' final days in power.
5. The Revolution Falters: Protecting the Legacy
Although the Sandinistas passed a large amount of legislation
during their eleven years in power, their efforts were often far from
organized. In this regard, one of their most blatant shortcomings was
the failure to adequately title the land they redistributed.
With respect to the process of recording title to land
redistributed under the Sandinistas' agrarian reform policies, Decree
Number 14, like Decree Number 782 which it amended, was lacking
in specifics. 135 Instead of providing for a well-defined process for the
recording of title, Article 35 of the new Agrarian Reform Law simply
stated that "[tihe Public Registers of Immovable Property shall
inscribe the Titles of Agrarian Reform and other agreements issued
by the MIDINRA.' 13 6 This mention of titling, however, was more
than the Sandinistas had done previously. Indeed, it was only in the
years following the passage of Decree Number 14, and as their power
began to wane, that the Sandinistas really gave much thought to the
titling process at all. 1 37 Having long neglected this most essential
aspect of property law, the Sandinistas busied themselves in their
final days following their defeat to Violeta Barrios Chamorro with the

130.
Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Nicaragua [Cn.][Constitution]
pmbl., La Gaceta [L.G.] 9 Jan. 1987, as amended by Ley No. 330, Reforma Parcial a la
Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Nicaragua, Jan. 18, 2000, L.G. Jan. 19, 2000
(Nicar.).
131.
Id. ch. II.
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Id. art. 106.
133.
Id. art. 107.
134.
See infra Part III.A.5.
135.
See id. art. 35.
136.
Id.
137.
See Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 768-69.
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passage of a series of laws, commonly referred to as the "pifiata."'138
These laws represented an attempt to give legal effect to their
agrarian reform and other property redistribution schemes.' 3 9 In the
end, however, the "pifiata" legislation only served to create
controversy as Nicaragua's democratic post-Sandinista governments
have been faced with the task of reconciling titles granted to
Sandinista land beneficiaries with claims brought by former
landowners, including, to a large extent, exiles who fled the country
14 0
during the civil war.
Still, the Sandinistas based their last-ditch titling efforts on their
own prior legislative decrees, labeling them as necessary for the
"legal protection of the occupants that until now have not been
included in previous property transfer programs.' 14 1
In what
amounted to perhaps an absurdly oversimplified process, the
Sandinistas' titling laws deemed all unrecorded property which had
passed under the prior land redistribution decrees to be "property of
the State.' 1 42 Furthermore, title to this property was guaranteed in
Law Number 85, the most comprehensive of the 1990 titling laws, to
any Nicaraguan who, as of the February 25, 1990 date of the
Sandinistas' electoral defeat, occupied an "urban house" in any
manner, including by "assignment, possession, inheritance or any
other form of tenancy," and owned no other property.' 4 3 Similar
measures, such as Laws 86 and 88, ensured title to occupants of
"urban lots" and rural properties, respectively. 144
In granting immediate legal title to the occupants of such land,
the Sandinistas' "pifiata" laws further exempted the new owners from
having to prove either payment of property taxes or recording fees for
these transactions. Recording was carried out free of charge by the
national Notaries and Registries. 145 Additionally, the new measures

138.
See U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua, Economic and Commercial Section,
Nicaraguan Property Law-An Overview
1, http://managua.usembassy.gov/wwwhe
70.html [hereinafter Nicaraguan Property Law].
139.
Id. Laws 85, 86, and 88 were all passed by the Sandinistas following their
February 25, 1990 electoral defeat by Violeta Barrios Chamorro. See Leyes No. 85, 29
Mar. 1990, Ley de Transmisi6n de la Propiedad de Viviendas y Otros Inmuebles
Pertenecientes al Estado y sus Instituciones [Law of Transfer of Property of Dwellings
and Other Immovable Belongings of the State and its Institutions], La Gaceta [L.G.],
30 Mar. 1990 (Nicar.); Leyes No. 86, 29 Mar. 1990, Ley Especial de Legalizaci6n de
Viviendas y Terrenos [Special Law of Legalization of Dwellings and Lands], La Gaceta
[L.G.], 3 Apr. 1990 (Nicar.); Leyes No. 88, 2 Apr. 1990, Ley de Protecci6n a la Propiedad
Agraria [Law of Protection of Agrarian Property], La Gaceta [L.G.], 5 Apr. 1990
(Nicar.).
140.
See Nicaraguan Property Law, supra note 138,
9-15; Leyes No. 85, 29
Mar. 1990; Leyes No. 86, 29 Mar. 1990; Leyes No. 88, 2 Apr. 1990.
141.
Leyes No. 85, 29 Mar. 1990, consideration 2.
142.

Id. art. 1.

143.
144.
145.

Id.; Nicaraguan Property Law, supra note 138,
Nicaraguan Property Law, supra note 138, 7.
Leyes No. 85, 29 Mar. 1990 art. 10.
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significantly reduced the documentary evidence that the new owners
had to present in order to obtain title to their land. 146 Law Number
88, meanwhile, further grounded the titling provisions not only in the
147
Sandinistas' property reform decrees, but in the 1987 Constitution.
Law Number 88 also notably cancelled any pending government
indemnification bonds created by Decree Number 14, the new
Agrarian Reform Law, which was not a surprising result considering
the Sandinistas no longer needed the support of the opposition
following their electoral upset in February 1990.148
Quite predictably, the titling laws resulted in the issuance and
recording of vast numbers of legal property titles in the weeks
following the Sandinistas' electoral defeat, many of which were
obtained with scanty documentary proof, and rather non-uniform
titling practices amongst the various Registry sites. 149 Almost
certainly sensing the impending ideological shift that would be
ushered in by President Chamorro, the Sandinistas attached a
foreboding warning to Law Number 85, stating that "[t]his Law is
public order and the rights and benefits conferred by it are nonrenouncable. '150 Ironically, however, the titling laws which the
Sandinistas justified as necessary for "the social order, national
reconciliation and the tranquility of Nicaraguan homes"'15 1 did little
more than create widespread confusion and major obstacles for
Nicaragua's
post-1990
democratically-elected
presidential
15 2
administrations.
B. DemocraticAttempts to Reconcile SandinistaLand Policy
While Violeta Chamorro's assumption of the presidency in 1990
marked the end of the Sandinistas' political control of the
government, their land redistribution and titling schemes have
proven far more enduring. Following Chamorro's victory in the
February elections, many Nicaraguans foresaw the initiation of a
"Counter-Reform" aimed at correcting the expropriations and other
15 3
alleged violations created by a decade of Sandinista land reform.
In a nation still recovering from a civil war of almost identical
duration, however, the new Chamorro administration found its hands
154
largely tied with respect to the delicate issue of property.
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148.
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Leyes No. 88, 2 Apr. 1990, Ley de Protecci6n a la Propiedad Agraria [Law of
of Agrarian Property] art. 1, La Gaceta [L.G.], 5 Apr. 1990 (Nicar.).
Id. art. 5.
See e.g., Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 7.
Leyes No. 85, 29 Mar. 1990 art. 14.
Id. art. 1.
See e.g., Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 7.
Arag6n Manzanarez, supra note 81, § 6.
See e.g., Clark & Velazquez, supra note 5, at 8.
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Recognizing the need to balance the interests of individuals who
had both received and lost property under the Sandinistas' land
redistribution policies, 15 5 the Chamorro administration was hesitant
to accept proposals such as Law Number 130, which advocated
returning all property which had passed under the Sandinista
decrees to the state, which would then adjudicate claims between new
and former "owners."'1 56 Instead, Chamorro began her reconciliation
efforts by creating a National Confiscation Revision Commission-to
be overseen by the Procurador General de Justicia and four
individuals appointed by the executive-which was designed to
review claims submitted by individuals whose land had been
expropriated by the Sandinistas. 157 Next, Chamorro created the
Office of Territorial Ordering in 1991 to review the validity of titles
granted under two of the Sandinistas' urban property "pifiata" laws,
Laws 85 and 86.158 In particular, the Office of Territorial Ordering
was empowered to examine beneficiaries' compliance with the
requirements of Laws 85 and 86, and either issue solvencias
validating the beneficiaries' titles, or nullify their titles and begin the
process of returning the property to its original owners. 159 Although
the Office of Territorial Ordering eventually nullified approximately
half of the titles granted by the Sandinistas under Law 85, it
approved virtually all of those granted under Laws 86 and 88.160
Finally, President Chamorro created one additional administrative
agency,
the Indemnification
Quantification
Agency,
which
complemented the National Confiscation Revision Commission, and
was designed to value the claims of landowners whose property had
16 1
been improperly expropriated by the Sandinista regime.
With a new administrative framework in place, Chamorro was
ready to begin work on the actual substance of her compensation
proposals, such as Law Number 180, known as the "Special Law of
Valuation for Payment Bonds for Indemnification.' 1 6 2 Chamorro's

155.
See Shirley Christian, This Land is Your Land... This Land is My Land,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1992, at Al.
156.
Arag6n Manzanarez, supra note 81, at § 6.
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Confiscaciones [Decree-Law of Revision of Confiscations] art. 1, La Gaceta [L.G.], 23
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Decretos Ejecutivos No. 35-91, 19 Aug. 1991, Creaci6n y Funcionamiento de
la Oficina de Ordenamiento Territorial [Creation and Operation of the Office of
Territorial Ordering] arts. 1-2, La Gaceta [L.G.], 23 Aug. 1991 (Nicar.).
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160.
Nicaraguan Property Law, supra note 138, 7.
161.
Decretos Ejecutivos No. 51-92, 30 Sept. 1992, Creaci6n de la Oficina de
Cuantificaci6n de Indemnizaciones [Creation of the Indemnification Quantification
Agency] arts. 1-3, La Gaceta [L.G.], 30 Sept. 1992 (Nicar.).
162.
Id.; Leyes No. 180, 12 July 1994, Ley Especial de Valorizaci6n de Bonos de
Pago por Indemnizaci6n [Special Law of Valuation for Payment Bonds for
Indemnification], La Gaceta [L.G.], 28 July 1994 (Nicar.).
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Law Number 180 was, in all respects, a compromise solution, which
clearly acknowledged from the outset that "the solution of the
property conflict in Nicaragua constitutes without a doubt one of the
greatest obstacles to the reconciliation of our people.' 163
Law
Number 180 attempted to satisfy both sides by allowing those who
had received land and title under the Sandinista regime to retain
such property, while at the same time affording expropriated
individuals a generous compensation package of government
indemnification bonds. 164
In specific terms, Law Number 180 both revalued the
Sandinistas' indemnification bonds and renegotiated their payment
terms and interest rates, providing for repayment over a five-year
period commencing in ten years. 165 The interest rate of the bonds
was set at 3% per year for the first two years of the plan, which was
to be capitalized into the principal, after which time the interest rate
would slowly increase from 4.5% to 5% annually, to be payable to the
bondholder on a monthly basis. 16 6
Finally, and with certain
exceptions, Law Number 180 allowed the bondholders to use the
bonds to purchase public utilities or pay other debts owed to the state
as if they were actual money, and required banks and financial
institutions in Nicaragua to accept the bonds as guarantees on loans
or other debts incurred by the bondholders. 167 Although far from the
expropriated landowners' favorite option, Chamorro's Law Number
180 at least moderately increased the value of the government
indemnification bonds they received, and created a market whereby
the bonds could be bought and sold at a more reasonable fraction of
16 8
their actual value.
In addition to revaluing the indemnification bonds, the
Chamorro administration attempted to lend some stability to the
nation's property crisis through the passage of Law Number 209,
entitled the "Stability Property Law."'16 9 The Stability Property Law
can only be described as another example of Chamorro's balancing
act, whereby she attempted to respect both the rights of the
Sandinista beneficiaries and the claims of the expropriated former
landowners. 17 0 Among other things, Law Number 209 increased the
legal effect on the decisions of the Office of Territorial Ordering,
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extended the timeframe by which landowners could submit claims to
the National Confiscation Revision Commission, and provided for
indemnification bonds for Sandinista beneficiaries who were denied
171
solvencias and lost what they had thought was their land.
In a final attempt to legitimize her own reforms before leaving
office, Chamorro participated in the passage of a partial amendment
of the 1987 Sandinista Constitution in February 1995, during the last
year of her presidency. 172 Amongst other democratic guarantees,
Law Number 192 amended Article 44 of the 1987 Constitution to
guarantee all Nicaraguans "the right of private property in movable
and immovable goods, and in the instruments and means of
production."'1 73 Additionally, Law Number 192 grounded the nation's
past and future property disputes in the law, stating simply that the
law shall be used to determine all issues involving not only
expropriations and indemnification, but also the latifundismo so
174
detested by the Sandinistas.
While Chamorro was only the first of the three presidents to be
democratically elected in Nicaragua since the end of the Sandinista
regime, it was during her tenure that the Sandinistas' land reform
policies had to be most definitively addressed. 175 As the years passed
since the exiles fled Nicaragua and their land was expropriated by
the government, it became more difficult to contemplate returning
land that had either been occupied for many years by the Sandinista
beneficiaries, or sold by them to those who many claimed were
innocent third-party purchasers. 176 Still, President Arnoldo Aleman,
Chamorro's successor, campaigned successfully on a platform of
protecting small Sandinista beneficiaries while returning larger
tracts of land occupied by beneficiaries who failed to pay back
property taxes to their original owners. 17 7
In 1997, Aleman
succeeded in getting yet another "Law Regarding Reformed Urban
and Agrarian Property" passed by Nicaragua's legislature. 178
Aleman's Law Number 278 required the Sandinista beneficiaries of
large tracts of land to pay a property tax value determined by the
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National Confiscation Revision Commission and the Indemnification
Quantification Agency, which was later to be transferred to the land's
1 79
original owners in the form of government indemnification bonds.
Additionally, under Law 278, if the Sandinista beneficiaries did not
pay the amount required under the act, the state could foreclose on
the property and return it to the original landowners. 8 0 The filing
deadline for claims by original landowners was December 2000.181
Claimants who had not filed by this date could still challenge the
validity of the beneficiaries' title in the Nicaraguan courts if they felt
the beneficiaries did not receive title in accordance with the loose
requirements of the Sandinista "pifiata" laws. However, as the U.S.
Property Claim Office at the U.S. Embassy in Managua notes, "[t]his
is a prolonged and costly procedure that puts the claimant at the
mercy of the often corrupt and inefficient court system."'18 2 Thus,
even under the provisions enacted during the Chamorro and Aleman
administrations, for the vast majority of those who lost their land
under the Sandinistas, the fifteen-year bonds have been the closest
they have come to having their property disputes officially
i8 3
resolved.
Taking office over a decade after the Sandinistas left power,
current Nicaraguan President Enrique Bolafios has focused more on
fighting corruption and attracting foreign investment to Nicaragua
than on resolving Nicaragua's property crisis. 184 But with the title to
as much as 25% of rural properties and 10% of urban properties still
85
disputed, Nicaragua's property crisis is still not entirely resolved.'
Although many property claims have simply disappeared with the
passage of time, new proposals continue to be introduced periodically
along political lines.' 8 6 Indeed, as recently as February 2005, the
Sandinista FSLN party proposed a new law known as the "Law to
Create a Superintendency of Reformed Urban and Renewal
Property," which called for further efforts to legalize the disputed
87
titles of beneficiaries to land expropriated during the 1980s.1
Sensing a possible threat to Nicaragua's democratic progress, the
U.S. Congress signaled its disapproval of the new law by raising the
possibility that it would cut U.S. foreign aid to Nicaragua if the new
88
law were to pass.'
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While the threat of civil war in Nicaragua has declined
significantly over the past fifteen years, new problems have arisen in
the property context, such as the rise of urban squatter settlements,
and the way to organize title to such property in a democratic
Nicaragua. 8 9 And while foreign investors have shown renewed
interest in Nicaragua, the lingering property and titling uncertainties
the country continues to face remain impediments to all development
in Nicaragua, both foreign and domestic. 190 Additionally, although
Nicaragua's fifteen-year democracy has received much acclaim from
the international community, political upheavals continue to occur. 19 1
In 2003, Arnoldo Aleman, Nicaragua's former president, was
sentenced to twenty years house arrest for corruption and the theft of
approximately $100 million from the national treasury. 19 2 Current
President Enrique Bolafios, who served as Aleman's vice president,
has also had to deal with attempts by Aleman and former Sandinista
leader Daniel Ortega to undermine his authority and impeach him in
the national legislature since the beginning of his presidency in
2002.193 Indeed, it was only with the strong support of the United
States, and a visit by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick
to Nicaragua in October 2005, that Aleman and Ortega vowed to step
back and permit Bolafios to govern during the last year of his
presidency. 194 Unfortunately for Bolafios, the new-found support has
been too little too late, and there remains little opportunity for
Bolafios to enact any meaningful change before Nicaraguan voters
return to the polls in November 2 0 0 6 .195
In yet another twist of Nicaraguan politics, the country's fourth
round of democratic post-Sandinista elections might very well bring
FSLN leader Daniel Ortega, who was a mastermind of the Sandinista
land reform, back to the executive office. 196 Such a result would not
be entirely surprising given the election of a number of left-leaning
presidents throughout Latin America in recent years. 19 7 The trend of
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electing leftist presidents in Latin America has already swept Chile,
Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, and perhaps culminated in the
election of indigenous peasant coca-leader Evo Morales in Bolivia in
December 2005.198 Promising to initiate sweeping reforms, including
the nationalization of the nation's hydrocarbon resources, Evo
Morales has made many Latin America-watchers nervous about what
his victory could mean for the rest of the region. 199
Although Morales initially promised not to nationalize the
property of transnational companies in Bolivia, many observers
foresaw his pre-inauguration visits to Cuba and Venezuela as a sign
of his potentially revolutionary policies. Indeed, less than six months
into his presidency, Morales returned to Havana, and on April 29,
2006, entered into the "Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas,"
along with the presidents of Cuba and Venezuela, in an effort to
create a socialist free trade alternative to the models offered by the
United States. 200 The cause for concern among foreign investors
increased substantially the following day, on May 1, 2006, as
Morales ordered the Bolivian military to take control of the country's
vast natural gas fields as part of his newly-announced plan to
partially nationalize the country's energy industry. 20 1
Under
Morales' plan, foreign energy companies operating in Bolivia must
sign new contracts with the Bolivian state-run energy company
within six months, or face explusion from the country. 20 2 -Moreover,
Morales' partial nationalization of his country's natural gas fields
appears to be just a first round of expropriations, as he stated
publicly on May 1, 2006, that "This is just the start ...tomorrow or
the day after it will be mining, then the forestry sector, and
eventually all the natural resources for which our ancestors
fought. 2 0° 3 Although some commentators distinguish Evo Morales'
win in Bolivia as a peasant revolution, still others view his success as
offering hope to Nicaragua's own ethnic party, Yapti Tasba Masrika
Nani (YATAMA), which has recently made efforts to form a coalition
204
with non-indigenous parties, including the FSLN.
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While many in the international community view the rise of
indigenous political parties as a precursor to the sort of mass
expropriations and land confiscations undertaken in Nicaragua under
the Sandinista leadership and in Bolivia under Evo Morales, others
see their rise as an opportunity for Latin America's poorest citizens to
finally participate in the political process. 20 5 Instead of simply
bringing leftist politicians to power, advocates of the indigenous
peasant revolutions view these parties as a means of encouraging
democracy among people who have little experience with, or
confidence in, such ideals. 20 6 Thus, as Nicaragua's own elections
near, the international community would be wise to distinguish
between the country's poor, and overwhelmingly indigenous,
population and the FSLN leaders who seek yet another opportunity
to return to power and further bolster the controversial reforms they
first began over two decades ago.

IV. LOOKING AHEAD: THE NEED FOR REAL PROGRESS
Over the past three, and soon to be four, trips to the polls,
Nicaragua as a nation has become more comfortable than ever before
with notions of democracy and foreign investment. At the same time,
however, history is never far away as the FSLN and the old
Sandinista leadership await any opportunity to return to power. As
the country faces another presidential election in November 2006, it
is important that the international community attempt to preserve
the progress that has been made, in particular, in settling property
claims and attracting foreign development to Nicaragua.
With respect to the property claims, it is clear that Violeta
Barrios Chamorro was the most successful of Nicaragua's postSandinista presidents in healing a nation scarred by more than a
decade of civil war and mass property confiscations. Still, President
Chamorro was largely restricted in the amount of change she could
institute given the fact that Nicaragua's new democracy was quite
fragile throughout her entire term in office. Additionally, Nicaraguan
politics under Chamorro's successors, Presidents Aleman and
Bolafios, has not been an entirely positive, nor democratic experience.
President Aleman, in particular, spent much of his presidency
pilfering Nicaragua's state coffers, while President Bolafios' anticorruption platform was hijacked by an unexpected coalition between
Aleman and the FSLN's Daniel Ortega. As a result of the instability
that has persisted in Nicaragua, even after its much-celebrated
transition to "democracy," the expropriation and nationalization
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policies undertaken ,by the Sandinistas have not been even close to
reversed. Many of the exiles who, according to the Sandinistas,
"abandoned" their property have not returned to Nicaragua. Those
exiles who have returned to their homeland have not received land,
but rather severely devalued government indemnification bonds in
exchange for their losses.
As Nicaragua awaits this year's presidential elections, there is
renewed hope that the country can finally move forward on a number
of fronts. Although time has shown that Nicaraguan politics is far
from predictable, a number of factors suggest that the country may
soon enjoy greater success in strengthening its democracy and
promoting its economy. First, despite the fact that Bolafios is now
widely considered to be a "lame duck" president,20 7 his ability to
survive the power struggle orchestrated by Aleman and Ortega has
vindicated his attempts to fight government corruption in Nicaragua.
Moreover, in light of the leftist political climate sweeping Latin
America as a whole, the strong support that Bolafios received from
the United States during his .recent political crisis proves that the
international community is still very much interested in Nicaragua's
future. Nicaragua, therefore, stands in a positive position to attract
increased foreign aid if its next leader remains committed to
furthering Bolafios' goals of fighting corruption and promoting
democracy in the country. Additionally, with every new presidential
election in Nicaragua comes the realization that both the Somoza
dynasty and the Sandinista regime are parts of an increasingly
distant past. Nicaragua's future leaders, therefore, should benefit
from the fact that they are not forced to operate under the painful
memories of the Revolution that constrained Violeta Chamorro
during her presidency. Rather than passing legislation that simply
attempts to avoid public unrest by giving validity to the past policies
of the Sandinista regime, such as Chamorro's Law 180 and Aleman's
Law 278, Nicaragua's future presidents should instead finally be able
to focus on reforms that actually begin a new chapter in the country's
history.
Despite Nicaragua's optimistic prospects in the next elections,
neither the international community nor the country's truly
democratic candidates should doubt the fragility of the current
climate. Indeed, for the international community, recent elections
throughout Latin America should highlight the fact that many leftist
groups have traded in their guns from the 1980s for a trip to the
ballot box and an opportunity to inaugurate their revolutionary
policies the "democratic" way.
From Venezuela to Bolivia,
democratically-elected leaders are either instituting or considering a
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number of revolutionary policies, including land reform and
expropriations, after securing a majority of votes in fair elections
monitored by the international community. 20 8 And in Nicaragua,
where Daniel Ortega and the very same Sandinista leaders who gave
birth to a bloody revolution were among the first to form a political
party, the international community should be especially cognizant of
the potential for a return to Sandinista rule.
Nicaragua's greatest, and perhaps only, prospect for lasting
democracy requires that it attract large-scale foreign investment.
Rather than simply remaining the beneficiary of foreign aid,
Nicaragua requires private foreign investment in order to truly
develop. While aid packages are granted and rescinded in accordance
with the whims of foreign governments, private foreign investment
can anchor investors' prospects to those of the nation itself. This fact
is nowhere more evident than in Nicaragua's neighbor to the south,
Costa Rica, which is widely recognized as the poster child of both
foreign investment and democracy in Latin America. 20 9 But before
foreign investors will truly be willing to do business in Nicaragua,
they must be convinced that their investments will be secure. Not
surprisingly, this guarantee will, in many ways, require Nicaragua to
reconcile its past with its future. First, Nicaragua's next president
must work with the legislature to once and for all resolve all
remaining title discrepancies.
Obviously, it is far too late to
substantially alter the policies begun by President Chamorro in Law
180, and continued by President Aleman in Law 278. Indeed, the
period by which expropriated landowners had to submit claims under
Law 278 has already passed by over five years. Instead, and whether
or not he or she agrees with such rulings, Nicaragua's next president
must ensure that the titles to all property in Nicaragua reflect the
decisions of Chamorro's administrative agencies as to the identity of
the true owners. More importantly, land title in Nicaragua has to be
easily searchable so that foreign investors wishing to purchase
property can easily determine the legality of their transactions.
Finally, for Nicaragua to attract any meaningful degree of foreign
investment, there must be reasonable assurances that the country
will enjoy some level of stability in the coming decades. All the
progress in the world will mean little to foreign investors if there is a
sizeable chance that the next administration will reverse course and
expropriate their valuable holdings.
It is worth noting in conclusion that the above scenario
represents a seemingly insurmountable dialectic: for democracy in
Nicaragua to be truly successful, the country requires the sort of
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development that only foreign investment can bring, while at the
same time, foreign investment will not be attracted to Nicaragua
until it democratizes. In the absence of a clear solution, foreign
investment and true democracy in Nicaragua will require risk-taking
on both sides. For his part, President Bolafios has made great strides
in fighting corruption and keeping the FSLN at bay.
The
international community, and the United States in particular, will do
everything possible to prevent a hijacked election, or an FSLN
victory, in November. After that, Nicaragua's best hope is that these
efforts usher in a new administration committed to democracy and
foreign investment, and that, for foreign investors, this will be
enough to induce them to take Secretary Baker's proverbial "one
2 10
more look" at Nicaragua.
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